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THE CASE OF THE CONFIDENTIAL
CONFESSION: PSYCHIATRY
Daniel W. Shuman*
The law, medicine, and theology trilogy uniting these Essays,
addressing the ethical response to information a professional gains in
confidence about a wrongful conviction and an impending execution,
raises an overarching question: How does the role of a professional
affect our ethical duties as members of society? Likely, few would
seriously argue that if the same disclosure about an impending
wrongful execution were made to a friend wearing no professional
garb that we would find an ethical duty to prevent the friend from
disclosing a confidence, rather than an ethical duty compelling the
friend to come forward to avoid the wrongful execution. Does the
role of a professional displace personal moral standards? Implicit in
the problem is the assumption that professionals should act differently.
Attempts to articulate a profession's sense of its unique ethical
responsibilities are contained, in part, in its ethical code. Psychiatric
ethics draw from the field of medical ethics.' Medical codes of ethics,
however, have never contemplated an absolute duty of confidentiality.
For example, the oath attributed to the fourth-century B.C.E.
physician Hippocrates obliges physicians to keep confidential only
those things that ought to be kept confidential, without elaborating on
what those may be: "Whatsoever in the course of practice I see or
hear (or even outside of my practice in social intercourse) that ought
never to be published abroad, I will not divulge, but consider such
things to be holy secrets."2 The historical context in which this
ambiguous pledge of confidentiality arose raises serious questions
about the concerns intended to guide this implementation of
professional secrecy. Hippocrates was associated with the mainstream
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1. CHAUNCEY D. LEAKE, PERCIVAL'S MEDICAL ETHics 287 (1927).
2. Id. at 214 (emphasis added).
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of the Pythagorean school of thought, which sought to limit public
dissemination of its knowledge, apparently for anticompetitive
reasons. Moreover, the communal character of life in the fourth
century B.C.E. permitting an audience of the sick person's friends and
relatives during treatment, belies the notion of confidentiality as a
normative concept in medicine.
By the time of the Hippocratic Oath's incorporation into the 1847
Code of Ethics of the American Medical Association, the physician's
duty of confidentiality and its limitations remained similarly nonabsolute and ambiguous: "Secrecy and delicacy, when requiredby peculiar
circumstances, should be strictly observed-and the familiar and
confidential intercourse to which physicians are admitted in their
professional visits, should be used with discretion, and with the most
scrupulous regard to fidelity and honor."3 The current nonabsolute
codification of this duty of confidentiality now reads: "A physician
shall respect the rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health
professionals, and shall safeguard patient confidences within the
constraints of the law."4 Although acknowledging that the scope of
confidentiality requires balancing a variety of interests, the current
code provides no specific ethical guidance for resolving the instant
case. The obligation to respect the patient's rights does little to
inform the physician about his or her ethical obligation beyond telling
a physician to obey the law. The "constraints of the law" escape
clause refers to such things as the statutory duty to report child
abuse 5 and the judge-made tort law duty, in cases like Tarasoff v.
6 to disclose patient confidencRegents of the University of California,
es when necessary to protect third parties from patients. While there
is no existing legal duty to breach confidentiality to report past crimes
or to avoid executions of the innocent, we might craft a persuasive
argument supporting a legal duty to breach confidentiality in order to
protect against executions of the innocent that is as compelling as the
legal duties to breach confidentiality to protect against child abuse or
patient violence. However, that would be a legal solution, not an
ethical one.
3. Id. at 219-20 (emphasis added).
4. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH

(1993).
5. Daniel W. Shuman, The Duty of the State to Rescue the Vulnerable in the United
States, in THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AID 131 (Michael A. Menlowe & Alexander McCall
Smith eds., 1993).
6. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY
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Ethics are systems for making moral decisions; laws are systems
for setting enforceable, socially acceptable minimal levels of conduct.
The pervasiveness of law in our post-modem American culture
creates a tendency to view law as setting the outer boundaries for
decisionmaking, thereby rendering ethics inconsequential. This perception undermines the importance of moral choice in decisionmaking, a point underscored by the decision to focus these Essays on
ethical rather than legal solutions. Thus, to address the appropriate
ethical balance in this case requires that we consider why psychiatrists
claim they are ethically constrained to keep the confidences of their
patients, and whether that consideration should be important enough
to avoid nondisclosure of a confidence that would apparently avoid
the execution of an innocent man.
Consequentialist and deontological rationales provide support for
the confidentiality of psychiatrist-patient communications. The consequentialist rationale posits that because of the sensitivity of the
problems for which people seek mental health care, confidentiality is
essential to encourage people with mental or emotional problems to
seek out therapists; to make candid disclosures which are necessary
for effective treatment; and to avoid disruption of the treatment
relationship. While superficially compelling, one difficulty with this
rationale is that its support in empirical research is equivocal, at
best.7 Natural experiments provide evidence of the problem of
proving that an assurance of confidentiality is essential for successful
therapeutic outcomes. For example, although patients state, when
asked, that confidentiality is important to them, there is no evidence
of differences in the number of patients seeking treatment or its
outcome following highly publicized revelations of the limitations on
confidentiality, such as the decision in Tarasoff obligating therapists
to breach confidentiality to protect individuals endangered by their
patients.8 While it may be sensible in general for psychotherapists to
keep psychotherapist-patient discussions confidential, the risk of
disclosure does not demonstrably affect the therapeutic decisions of
most patients or prospective patients.
Moreover, the assertion that confidentiality is necessary for
effective treatment by psychotherapists relies on an uncritical

7. DANIEL W. SHUMAN & MYRON F. WEINER, THE PSYCHOTHERAPIST-PATIENT
PRIVILEGE: A CRITICAL EXAMINATION 77-113 (1987).
8. Toni Pryor Wise, Note, Where the Public Peril Begins: A Survey of Psychotherapists to Determine the Effects of Tarasoff, 31 STAN. L. REV. 165, 165 (1978).
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assumption about the efficacy of psychotherapy. Even if confidentiality is necessary, it may not be sufficient for effective psychotherapy.
Psychotherapy does not work for all. For example, antisocial
personality disorders, characterized by a "pattern of disregard for, and
violation of the rights of others" 9-- not surprisingly, a mental
disorder commonly diagnosed in the criminal population,"0 and the
only clue we have about the mental disorder that resulted in the
patient seeking therapy in this case-are not receptive to psychotherapy."
Thus, it is not clear whether in this instance a potential
therapeutic benefit can be gained through recognition of a duty of
confidentiality for this patient or the class of persons he represents.
The deontological rationale for keeping patient confidences
between therapist and patient is that a democratic society should
recognize the dignity of the individual by protecting these intimate
communications from compelled disclosure.
This rationale for
confidentiality posits that compelled disclosure of confidential
communications is wrong in and of itself without regard to its
consequences. While there is a Kantian argument to be made in
favor of an absolute duty of confidentiality, few proponents of the
importance of confidentiality for its own sake argue for an absolute
duty of confidentiality. 2 Most recognize that some things are more
important than keeping confidences, although they differ on what
these things are.
The rationale for disclosure of this confidence seems, at first
blush, almost too obvious to iequire elaboration. It is important to
avoid executing the innocent both to avoid the wrongful loss of life
and to achieve just results in the criminal justice system. Our sense
of humanity and fairness, as well as Kafkaesque fears of our own
wrongful conviction, make this the ultimate measure of the workings
of the criminal justice system. Therefore, any information that helps
to avoid this wrong should be disclosed, without regard to the
professional context in which it was acquired. This argument posits
that psychotherapists, like all other members 6f society, bear an
ethical obligation to disclose confidences that would avoid a wrongful

9. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS 645 (4th ed. 1994).

10. See Al C. Edwards et al., Prison Inmates with a History of Inpatient Psychiatric
Treatment, 45 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 172 (1994).
11. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75 (1992).
12. See, e.g., William J. Winslade & Judith Wilson Ross, Privacy, Confidentiality,and
Autonomy in Psychotherapy,64 NEB. L. REV. 578, 630-31 (1985).
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loss of life. Yet, there is a risk of making too much of this argument
in favor of disclosure, both in terms of the historical accuracy of
disclosure in therapy and of the willingness of courts to give much
weight to this disclosure at this time.
Therapists do not seek historical truth in therapy. The question
for most psychotherapeutic techniques is how a patient perceives or
feels about the world that is real to that patient-not historical
truth." Even for those therapeutic techniques that involve confrontation and challenge of a patient's conceptions of events, therapists
rarely conduct factual investigations to verify patient claims in
therapy. Indeed, trying to do so by contacting third parties may
frustrate therapy. Moreover, courts and clinicians are now struggling
with the extent to which certain therapeutic techniques actually taint
memories. 4 Thus, it is naive to accept at face value the historical
accuracy of the disclosure to the psychiatrist in this case.
Even if the psychiatrist were to disclose the confidential
communication, it is not clear that the courts would now receive
evidence of this disclosure in a collateral attack on the conviction,
even one addressing innocence."5 Finality, no less so than accuracy,
is an essential element of any system for resolving disputes. Ultimately, we must be able to act on judicial decisions with confidence, not
only in their correctness, but also in their finality. The conviction may
not be overturned, and the execution may proceed, even if the
confidential communication is disclosed, because of a prioritization of
rules that recognize the importance of finality.
Thus, while the rationale for absolute confidentiality is not
compelling, neither is the rationale for disclosure. It is not clear that
a breach of confidentiality will lead to the death of effective therapy
or avoid the death of an innocent man. Requiring the psychiatrist to
choose unilaterally whether to disclose is ultimately unsatisfying.
A unilateral decision by the therapist simultaneously vests the
therapist with more power than she wishes and divests the patient of
more power than he wishes. Thus, it is the least-desired approach.
Because the revelation of this exculpatory evidence was made to the
psychiatrist in therapy, and because disclosure is affected by a duty of

13. See Marianne Wesson, HistoricalTruth, Narrative Truth, and Expert Testimony, 60
WASH. L. REv. 331, 334 (1985).
14. Bruce D. Sales et al., In a Dim Light: Admissibility of Child Sexual Abuse
Memories, 8 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 399, 400 (1994).
15. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400-04 (1993).

1722

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:1717

confidentiality thought to be important for therapy, addressing this
issue in therapy is a logical starting point. This approach might begin
with the therapist inquiring why the disclosure was made. If the
admission was made because the patient was troubled by his role in
the impending execution of an innocent man and is seeking guidance
on what to do about that, an ethically omniscient therapist may
address the patient's feelings of guilt and responsibility in therapy.
One possible outcome of exploring this issue is both therapeutic and
ethical. The patient may come to realize that he would not be able
to live with himself if the execution were to proceed and may
independently decide to disclose the communication or waive the
psychiatrist's ethical duty of confidentiality so that the psychiatrist
may disclose this evidence. Alternatively, addressing the issue in
therapy may leave the psychiatrist less certain that the patient actually
committed the murder and more inclined to think that the confession
resulted from guilt about his own criminal past or a desire to impress
or challenge the psychiatrist. Or, perhaps not.
This is a tale best left unfinished. While some ethical issues, like
the propriety of a therapist's sexual relationship with a patient, have
bright-line answers that should not vary from case to case, others, like
the disclosure of patient confidences concerning the guilt or innocence
of third persons, are case specific. Concrete ethical rules that provide
absolute answers to controversies like this one may assuage our desire
for certainty but ignore the nature of the therapist-patient relationship. Maximizing congruent therapeutic and ethical outcomes
requires carefully balancing competing and conflicting concerns that
certainty may frustrate. 16 If mental health professionals acting in
their professional capacity have ethical duties that vary from those of
other members of the populace, they arise from the unique skills we
assume that they possess and the unique conflicts that they are
required to address. Imposing one-size-fits-all solutions to these
controversies fails to acknowledge these unique skills and conflicts.

16. See ROBERT A. BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAW IN
DOCTOR-PATIENT RELATIONS vi (1979).

